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Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the
state budget—embezzling or misspending funds—or they can demand extra payments from citizens
in return for services—bribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery.
We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two
kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments
may tolerate some embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery—even though embezzlement
is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the “efficiency wage.” This logic
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1   Introduction 
Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from 
the state budget—embezzling or misspending funds that they control—or they can demand 
additional payments from citizens in return for services—bribery. Both of these abuses fit the 
definition of corruption—the misuse of public office for private gain.   
From the official’s point of view, these two methods of self-enrichment—bribery and 
embezzlement—are substitutes. From the point of view of society, they can have quite different 
costs. Bribe-extraction, if it targets firms, as usually assumed, and if the bribe is charged on top 
of official taxes and levies, increases the cost of doing business. Embezzlement—unless it 
prompts politicians to increase the tax rate to make up for embezzled revenues—does not 
increase companies’ costs directly.
1  
In this paper, we consider the dilemma politicians face in choosing a strategy to fight 
corruption in states with weak law enforcement institutions.
2 We argue that when politicians are 
sufficiently motivated to pursue economic development they will at times prefer to tolerate a 
certain level of embezzlement by their agents because to fight it more actively would divert 
corrupt officials into bribe-extraction, at a greater cost to growth. Furthermore, since one of the 
most significant costs of corruption is the waste of resources spent by officials in concealing 
their corrupt activities (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), politicians should tolerate this embezzlement 
even when it is quite open. The level of tolerated embezzlement is analogous to an efficiency 
wage. We show the logic of this argument in a simple model.  
                                                 
1 It may still be indirectly distortionary if it reduces public investment in productivity-enhancing infrastructure. 
 
2 In this paper, we study embezzlement by agents of the political leadership, rather than by the political leaders 
themselves. Of course, embezzlement by predatory political leaders such as Mobutu in Zaire and Marcos in the 
Philippines can be enormous in scope. However, such predation does not present the same puzzles we consider here.    2
Empirically, the paper is motivated by the case of China, where consumption of the state 
budget by officials—both illegal and tolerated—occurs on a massive scale, with surprisingly 
feeble attempts to stop it. There is no authoritative accounting of the extent and costs of different 
types of corruption in China (or in any other state, for that matter).
3 But evidence suggests that 
the scope of consumption by officials at the budget’s expense is immense. In 2007, the respected 
newspaper the Legal Daily estimated that the total bill for such consumption in 2006 came to 
1.07 trillion yuan ($143 billion), equal to about one quarter of the government’s total tax income 
and more than five percent of GDP.
4 This included publicly financed spending by bureaucrats on 
restaurant meals, alcohol, luxury cars, travel, and foreign tourism. At the local level, officials are 
known to spend lavishly on luxurious office buildings. Many local governments have off-budget 
revenue accounts for such spending, which are only loosely monitored by the central government 
(e.g. Qian and Weingast 1997). Some have special slush funds known as “small golden 
warehouses” (xiao jin ku) for dispensing publicly-provided cash and goods to officials.
5  
Such consumption of public funds by local officials is certainly not an objective of the 
central government. But the center’s enforcement against embezzlement is dilatory, especially 
compared to its efforts to combat bribery.
 Although high officials have been prosecuted recently 
                                                 
3 However, see Wedeman (2004) for an attempt to gauge the trends. One cannot simply look at rates of prosecution 
for different types of crime since if, as we are arguing, embezzlement is tolerated to some extent in order to decrease 
bribery, prosecutions might still be more frequent for embezzlement because it occurs on a larger scale and because 
enforcement against bribery has deterred most officials from engaging in it.  
 
4 Legal Daily, March 18, 2007; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009, gives China’s 2006 GDP as 
$2.66 trillion. For a very rough comparison with the scope of bribery, Cai, Fang, and Xu (2010) found in a large 
sample of Chinese firms in 2000-03 that “entertainment and travel costs” constituted about 4 percent of value added. 
They estimated that spending under this accounting category went towards (a) paying bribes to officials, (b) 
expenditures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients, and (c) managerial excesses. Almost all bribes 
would presumably be recorded under this heading. Thus, it appears that total spending on bribes in this sample 
constituted significantly less than 4 percent of value added. 
  
5 According to a report in Financial Daily (Cai-Jin Daily), the stock of funds and goods in the “small golden 
warehouses” of Chinese local governments in 2009 equaled 5 percent of GDP (www.businesstimes.com.hk/a-
20090509-10440/china050918). 
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for both infractions, the amounts embezzled often dwarf those collected as bribes.
6 A famous 
case targeted the mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong, in the mid-1990s. Chen was reported to have 
misappropriated $4.5 million in public funds (embezzlement), and to have accepted gifts worth 
$60,000 (bribery). His deputy, Wang Baosheng, who was later found with a bullet in his head, 
reportedly misappropriated about $68 million.
7 The two were said to have built “residential 
palaces” where they entertained mistresses at public expense. Such cases are not at all 
exceptional, as suggested by the survey in Sun (2004). In 1996, 479 cases of misappropriation of 
public funds were prosecuted where the amount in question was at least one million yuan (about 
$120,000); of these, five involved embezzlement of more than 100 million yuan (about $12 
million). There were only nine cases of bribery where the bribes amounted to one million yuan, 
and none for more than 10 million (Sun 2004, p.89).  
One striking illustration of the different attitudes of the leadership towards embezzlement 
and bribery is the fact that under Chinese law misappropriating public funds is not even illegal if 
the money is returned within three months.
8 Scholars have reported widespread “temporary 
misappropriations” by employees of the state banks, who have routinely used large amounts of 
their banks’ funds to speculate on stock and futures markets (Ding 2000). In fact, even the three 
months limit is not binding. Such misappropriations only become embezzlement if the money 
has not been returned “by the time the case is formally registered by the law-enforcer,” which 
                                                 
6 Measuring the extent of bribery is extremely difficult. However, much circumstantial evidence suggests it is less 
widespread. According to the Procuratorial Daily, 16,691 public officials were investigated in 2006, with the total 
corruption amount about 2.3 billion yuan (0.3 billion USD).  
 
7 Specifically, he was said to have “appropriated” $25 million and 100 million yuan, and to have “embezzled” over 
260,000 yuan (Sun 2004, p.130). For our purposes, both “appropriating” and “embezzling” public funds, as defined 
by Chinese law, constitute theft from the budget.  
8 Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 1997, Article 384, available at www.asianlii.org/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/cn/legis/cen/laws/cl104/cl104.html?query=embezzlement#13.   4
provides considerable flexibility. Ding reports that: “Numerous misappropriations have lasted for 
years but are still treated as ‘temporary’” (Ibid., p.673).  
One of the strangest features of the phenomenon of consumption from the state budget in 
China is how open it is. A major cost of corruption is usually thought to be the waste of 
resources and distortions that result from officials’ efforts to conceal their self-enrichment 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Yet, despite the prosecution annually of some of the biggest 
offenders, smaller scale consumption from the budget is almost universal. Even the state’s 
General Anti-Corruption Bureau was found in 1998 to be diverting confiscated crime funds to its 
staff (Ding 2000, p.674). By contrast, bribery is prosecuted even when the amounts are much 
smaller, and extra-harsh sentences are prescribed when the recipient “extorted” the bribe.
9 We 
argue that China’s political leaders deliberately tolerate a great deal of relatively small-scale 
embezzlement in order to reduce the incentive for officials to extract bribes, and that they do not 
always prosecute even quite open misappropriations in order to avoid prompting costly efforts at 
concealment.  
Distinguishing the consequences of different types of corruption suggests possible 
answers to long-debated questions about the political economy of development.
10 For decades, 
scholars have disputed whether corruption is harmful for growth, or, alternatively, “greases the 
wheels” of commerce, motivating officials to support business activity and waive growth-
impeding regulations. Our answer is that it depends what kind of corruption. While some types—
extracting bribes in addition to taxes—are clearly distortionary and reduce business activity, 
others—embezzlement from a government that uses revenues in unproductive ways—are not. 
                                                 
9 Ibid, Article 386.  
 
10 A parallel literature examines the tradeoffs for firms in choosing between alternative ways of influencing 
government (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya 2010; Harstad and Svensson 2010). 
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Still others—extracting bribes from businesses in place of taxes, which Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) call “corruption with theft”—may even lower the price of government services to 
businesses below their social cost, resulting in pro-business distortions. From this perspective, 
the co-existence of some kinds of corruption and rapid growth is not paradoxical and does not 
conflict with the observation of stagnation in countries with other kinds of corruption. Such a 
conditional relationship would explain why cross-national estimates of the cost of corruption for 
growth are relatively small and not always statistically significant (e.g., Mauro 1995).  
This would also help explain how China and some other East Asian countries have grown 
rapidly in recent decades despite apparently widespread corruption. Various explanations have 
been suggested—for instance, that corruption in China is more centralized than in most places, 
which reduces the problem of “overgrazing” (e.g. Rock and Bonnett 2004).
11 However, although 
politics in China is in many ways highly centralized, this does not seem to be the case for 
corruption. There is no sign of significant upward flows of money or even information about the 
scale of local graft. We suggest that in China, partly as a result of deliberate policy, the more 
growth-friendly types of corruption have predominated. The dramatic fall in tax revenues in the 
1980s is consistent with the notion that “corruption with theft” was spreading. More recently, as 
the state’s fiscal revenues stabilized, we suspect the balance shifted towards embezzlement. 
Although the choice by bureaucrats of less distortionary types of corruption is certainly not the 
only reason for China’s ability to grow rapidly despite widespread graft, we think it played a part.  
We develop a model that articulates the dilemma for central authorities monitoring agents 
with opportunities for different types of corruption. The model is related to others that treat the 
problem of corruption as one of agency (e.g. Rotberg 2003, Dixit 2008). Embezzlement here 
                                                 
11 For detailed theoretical and empirical analyses of centralized versus decentralized corruption, see for example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and  Olken and Barron (2009). 
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becomes analogous to an “efficiency wage.”
12 We show that when there are multiple types of 
corruption, it can be counterproductive to eliminate the types that are easy to monitor.  
As is well known, the most efficient way to resolve principal-agent problems usually 
involves a combination of “carrot” and “stick” strategies (e.g. Lazear 1995, Prendergast 1999).  
However, for political and other reasons, the “carrot” strategies commonly used by firms, such as 
the efficiency wage, are often hard to use in the public sector.
13 Setting the salaries of 
bureaucrats very high can provoke protest even in an authoritarian system such as China’s, and 
the size of premia necessary to deter the officials with the greatest opportunities for extortion 
would be unpopular in both democracies and dictatorships. (Indeed, the limits on such “carrot” 
strategies in the public sector may explain why “corruption” in firms is apparently much less 
widespread than in bureaucracies.) For a regime such as China’s, the need to avoid undercutting 
the egalitarian official ideology too overtly makes paying transparent efficiency wages 
particularly difficult. In such circumstances, embezzlement serves as an alternative. Besides 
ideological and political constraints, our model shows that the choice between paying an overt 
efficiency wage and tolerating embezzlement will depend on the government’s efficiency in 
monitoring embezzlement and bribe taking.  
In a way, the logic here mirrors that of Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) famous 
analysis of the multi-task principal-agent relationship. Holmstrom and Milgrom showed that if 
an agent engages in multiple tasks and if the tasks are complementary for producing output, it is 
often not optimal for the principal to pay the agent based on performance of the easily measured 
tasks. Doing so will motivate the agent to devote too much effort to the observable tasks and too 
                                                 
12 For theoretical discussions of efficiency wages and corruption, see, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974), 
Besley and McLaren (1993), Waller, Verdier, and Gardner (2002), and Fan (2006). 
 
13 For a survey of ways in which the principal-agent problem of governments differs from that of firms, see Dixit 
(2002).    7
little to the less observable ones. Analogously, we find that punishing officials strictly for 
engaging in a more observable kind of corruption motivates agents to engage in less observable 
kinds, which, in this case, are more distortionary. The main difference is that in Holmstrom and 
Milgrom’s model, the agent’s inputs all have positive effects on output, whereas in ours the 
effects are negative.  
We introduce our basic analytical framework in Section 2. As a benchmark, in Section 3 
we examine the equilibrium if paying an efficiency wage is an option. Section 4 then shows how 
embezzlement can serve as a substitute for the efficiency wage if the latter is unavailable. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2   The analytical framework 
To model corruption, we extend the formulation of Bliss and Di Tella (1997). A large number of 
potential firms are subject to regulation by a government, which consists of two players—a 
politician (or ruler) and a bureaucrat (or official).
14 The number of firms is assumed to be a 
continuum of Lebesgue measure one. The gross profit of a firm, denoted π, is distributed 
uniformly on the interval [0,1]. To operate, each firm must pay a tax to the ruler (through the 
official) and also obtain permission from the official. To focus on the central idea of this paper, 
we assume that tax evasion is impossible.
15 The official receives a fixed wage, w, from the ruler, 
which can be interpreted as including the prestige of office. We treat w here as a parameter not a 
variable. The idea is that, as discussed in the Introduction, political or ideological pressures 
                                                 
14 One can think of the bureaucrat as a group of officials, but to present the ideas as simply as possible we assume a 
single actor . Thus, we abstract from questions about rent-seeking within the bureaucracy, which are not the focus of 
this paper and are analyzed elsewhere (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
 
15 See Cai and Treisman (2004) for an analysis of the collaboration between firms and local governments in tax 
evasion.   8
constrain the government from setting the public sector wage too high. Thus, one can think of w 
as the maximum wage that these constraints permit, which may not be optimal for deterring 
bureaucratic corruption. (In Section 3, to provide a benchmark, we relax this assumption and 
solve the model supposing instead that the ruler can set an additional component of the official’s 
wage without constraint.) 
The official can supplement his wage income by demanding bribes from firms and 
embezzling tax revenues. We model the interaction between the ruler, official, and (potential) 
firms as a Stackelberg game. The ruler is the Stackelberg leader; at the start of play, he decides 
the tax rate and announces some anti-corruption measures that will be described later. The 
official moves next. Then, the (potential) firms decide whether or not to operate.  
Consider first the case of bribe extraction. We assume each firm knows the exact value of 
its π but that the ruler and official know only its distribution. Thus, the tax and the bribe must be 
the same for every firm entering the market, and we denote the tax and the bribe by t and b, 
respectively, where 0, 1 tb  .  
Since the total cost of operation is t + b, a firm’s net profit is: 
  b t     (2.1) 
Clearly, a firm will operate if and only if its net profit is positive. Thus, the ruler and the official 
take the probability that a firm will operate to be:  
  b t b t P b t P           1 ) ( 1 ) 0 (    (2.2) 
From (2.2), the greater is b or t, the fewer firms will enter the market. We assume that all firms 
make positive gross profits so that the first-best solution is having all firms enter. Thus, bribes 
reduce economic efficiency.   9
  As the number of firms is a continuum, we know from (2.2) that the fraction of firms 
entering the market is a constant,  b t   1 . If the official chooses to take bribes, his income from 
bribery will be:   
  ) 1 ( b t b    (2.3) 
Bribery increases the official’s income, but also increases the chance that the official is fired by 
the ruler. To reduce the probability of being caught, the official can devote resources to 
concealing his bribery (Rose Ackerman 1975, Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
 We assume he spends 
a fraction, x, of his bribe income on secrecy. Thus, the official’s net income from bribery is:   
  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( b t b x     (2.4) 
Of course, the effectiveness of the agent’s concealment measures depends on how much 
effort the ruler puts into monitoring bribery, which we denote . Most generally, the probability 
that the official is caught taking bribes is an increasing function of  and a decreasing function of 
x. To save algebra, we choose the simplest functional form that captures the idea that the waste 
of resources on secrecy depends on the effectiveness of the ruler’s enforcement efforts. 
Specifically, we assume that the probability that a bribe-taking official is caught equals one if 
  x  and    1 , if    x , where   is a constant and  1 0   .
16 Thus, we assume that the 
official’s concealment is never perfect: even if he sets    x , there is still a certain probability 
that he will be caught.
17 Since if    x  the official will be caught with certainty, if he chooses to 
extract bribes he needs to set:  
                                                 
16 Essentially similar modeling strategies are used to model firms’ hiding in the “informal sector” (e.g. Rausch 1991, 
de Paula and Scheinkman forthcoming). 
 
17 Superficially, it may appear to be a strong assumption that  is independent of b and x. However, note that from 
(2.4) the amount of resources the official spends on secrecy is  (1 ) xbt b   , which tends to increase with b when b 
is below a certain level. Thus, our assumptions already imply that concealing bribery gets more costly as the bribe 
increases. Moreover, the probability of getting caught is only independent of x assuming that x = θ. Thus, 1    
represents the residual risk of exposure even after the official has done his best to offset the ruler’s monitoring.   10
    x  (2.5) 
The official can also enrich himself by embezzling tax revenues. To focus on cases in 
which embezzlement is harder to conceal than bribery, we assume that in this case the official 
cannot invest in secrecy. So long as the ruler devotes some resources to monitoring 
embezzlement, there is a positive probability of exposure, defined as:  /( 1 ) ee    , where e 
denotes the amount the official embezzles, and  denotes the ruler’s monitoring effort. The 
probability the official is not caught for embezzlement is then:  
 
 e  1
1
 (2.6) 
From the ruler’s perspective, the official’s embezzlement is costly. We denote this cost:   
  e   (2.7) 
where  1    is a positive constant. For example, if embezzlement imposes political costs above 
and beyond the simple loss of revenue, then  1   .  
If an official is not caught for corruption, he consumes his full income. We denote the 
official’s utility function from consumption u(), and assume it to be strictly increasing and 
strictly concave. However, if the official is caught, then he is fired and receives neither his wage 
nor his income from embezzlement and bribery, which is confiscated. To save algebra, we 
normalize the utility of an official caught for corruption to be zero:  0 ) 0 (  u . Specifically, we 
assume that u() takes the functional form: 
 
 z z u  ) (  (2.8) 
where  is a constant and  1 0    .  
  Now consider the ruler’s objective function. Two extreme simplifications common in 
political economy models are that the ruler aims to maximize (a) the welfare of the public, or (b)   11
his own utility (or that of a ruling group).
18 Here, as in Cai and Treisman (2004), we assume the 
ruler maximizes some convex combination of these two objectives, specifically:  
 V ≡(ruler’s net revenue)+ (firms’ net profits)   (2.9) 
where  is a non-negative constant. To focus on the issue at hand, we abstract away from public 
good provision and assume the ruler consumes all his net revenue. Firms’ net profits represent 
the resources available for private consumption, and, in this very simple setup, also social 
welfare. (Thus, we also abstract from negative externalities of production.) The greater is , the 
more the ruler cares about social welfare. If  = 0, the ruler is purely predatory; as  gets very 
large, he approaches pure benevolence. To avoid the uninteresting case of a corner solution in 
which the ruler effectively only cares about the firms’ net profits and not at all about his own 
revenue, we assume  < 2.  
As the number of firms is normalized to one, the number and proportion of firms that 
choose to operate are both  ) 1 ( b t   , so the total tax collected is  ) 1 ( b t t   . Since  is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], the average and total profit of firms is (1 ) / 2 tb  , 












   (2.10) 
The ruler can potentially deter the official’s bribe extraction by increasing his monitoring 





                                                 
18 For example, Grossman (2000) provides a summary and assessment of these two views. 
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where A is a positive constant, which might, for instance, represent the (in)efficiency of law 
enforcement. This form is chosen for convenience, but has the intuitive properties, familiar from 
other neoclassical models of enforcement, that its first and second derivatives are positive: the 
cost of monitoring increases, and at an accelerating rate. Monitoring embezzlement is also costly. 
Again, for convenience, we assume the cost function takes a simple form with positive first and 
second derivatives:  
2  G        (2.12) 
where G is a non-negative constant. For notational convenience, we define  /2    . Now we 
can write the ruler’s objective function as:  
 
22 (1 ) (1 )
1
A
Vt t b t b e G  

      

 (2.13) 
A final simplifying assumption is that the ruler’s revenue is always sufficient to cover the level 
of expenditure on deterring bribery and embezzlement that he chooses, so we can neglect the 











3   Deterring bribery with the efficiency wage 
In order to show how embezzlement can substitute for the efficiency wage, we must first 
demonstrate how setting an efficiency wage deters bribe extraction. This will serve as a 
benchmark against which to compare the case of embezzlement. In this section, we use “e” to 
denote not the amount embezzled but the wage premium paid to the official to bring his wage up 
to the efficiency wage. In this case,  1   (the cost of the wage premium is simply the wage   13
premium) and G = 0 (no monitoring of embezzlement is needed in equilibrium because the 
efficiency wage deters embezzlement). In this game, clearly there are two possible subgames and 
equilibria, in one of which the official takes bribes and in one of which he does not.  
 
3.1   Subgame 1: The official takes bribes 
If the official takes bribes, his objective function can be expressed as follows: 
 
[ (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) (0)
[( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
b Uu w e x b t b u
uw e b t b


     
   
 (3.1) 
The first order condition from (3.1) is:  






   

 (3.2) 





                (3.3) 
which characterizes the official’s best response to the ruler’s choices of t,  and e.  Inserting (3.3) 
and  1    into (2.13) we get 
 









From (3.4), clearly, the ruler will set  0    and  0  e . Inserting these into (3.4), deriving the first 









t  (3.5) 
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3.2   Subgame 2: The official does not take bribes 
The official will choose not to take bribes if this yields greater utility, given the ruler’s choices of  






Uu w e 

    (3.7) 
On the other hand, if the official does not take bribes, his utility, denoted 
nb U , is: 
  ) ( e w u U
nb    (3.8) 
Thus, the official will choose not to take bribes if and only if  
  ) ( ]
4
) 1 (




e w u  

      (3.9) 














  (3.10) 
To save on the cost of monitoring, the ruler chooses the smallest  that satisfies (3.10), in which 














  (3.11) 
 (3.11) is the official’s “incentive compatibility constraint” for not taking bribes. That is, if (3.11) 
is satisfied, then b = 0. Inserting b = 0,  1   , G = 0, and (3.11) into (2.13), the ruler’s objective 
function becomes:  
22









   

   (3.12)   15
Suppose that the ruler’s optimal t is neither 0 nor 1. (In both these cases, his income will be zero, 
so the corner solutions are of limited interest.) The first order condition of (3.12) with respect to t 
is: 
  0 ) 1 (
) )( 1 ( 4
2
) 1 ( 2 2 1 1  
 







  (3.13) 
The first order condition of (3.12) with respect to e is: 
  0 1 ) 1 (
) )( 1 ( 4
2
2








(3.14) holds with strict equality if  0  e  and with strict inequality if  0  e . 
 
3.3   Subgame perfect equilibria 
We define 
 
b e V V V     (3.15) 
where 
e V is the ruler’s utility when the official does not take bribes and 
b V is his utility when the 
official takes bribes. Clearly the ruler will take measures, including paying an efficiency wage, to 
eliminate bribery if and only if  0  V .  
The model contains several important parameters. But the most important is A, which 
measures (negatively) the ruler’s efficiency in monitoring the official’s bribe extraction. Holding 
all parameters other than A constant, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold level of A, 
c A , such that:  
(1) If 
c A A , there is a unique equilibrium, in which the official takes bribes and the ruler does 
not monitor bribe extraction and does not pay the official an efficiency wage.     16
(2) If 
c A A , there is a unique equilibrium, in which the official does not take bribes and the 
ruler devotes some resources to monitoring bribe extraction; in addition, the ruler pays the 
official an efficiency wage if the following condition is satisfied,  




     
 
     A A w  (3.16) 
For all proofs, see appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 shows that the ruler will implement measures to eliminate bribe taking if 
and only if the monitoring mechanism is sufficiently powerful—that is, if A is small. Also, when 
c A A and when condition (3.16) is satisfied, the ruler pays the official an efficiency wage. It 
only makes sense to deploy these sticks and carrots, however, if they are effective enough to 
eliminate bribery. If the monitoring mechanism is not so powerful, using it will merely lead 
officials to waste more resources on concealing their misbehavior rather than persuade them to 
reduce their bribe extraction. In this case, the ruler would be better off not monitoring at all.  
Clearly, the left hand side of (3.16) decreases with , and increases with w. Also, when A is very 
small, (3.16) will not be satisfied. In summary, we have the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1.  If 
c A A , the ruler is more likely to pay an efficiency wage premium to the official 
when  is larger, w is smaller, and when A is not too small.  
 
  The intuition for Corollary 1 is straightforward. First, if the official’s basic wage, w, is 
already high, the ruler is less likely to need to pay a premium to bring his total compensation up 
to the efficiency wage level. Second, when  increases (the ruler cares more about public 
welfare), the ruler will be more motivated to eliminate the official’s bribery, costs of which are   17
predominantly borne by the public. Democracies, where rulers are constrained to place weight on 
public welfare, and growth-oriented autocracies are more likely to use efficiency wages to deter 
corruption when such instruments are available.
19 Third, when A is sufficiently small (the 
monitoring mechanism is highly effective), the ruler will not need to offer carrots as well as 
sticks.  
 
4   Embezzlement as a substitute for the efficiency wage 
Consider now cases in which political, ideological, or other constraints prevent the ruler from 
providing efficiency wage premia to potentially corruptible officials. Here we show how 
constrained embezzlement can serve as a substitute.
20  
First, note that if monitoring embezzlement is costless (G = 0), then tolerating 
embezzlement becomes a perfect substitute for paying an efficiency wage. The ruler can 
costlessly set   so high that any embezzlement is almost sure to be detected by him (see (2.6)). 
Rather than punishing all embezzlement, the ruler will then find it optimal to allow the official to 
embezzle an amount equivalent to the optimal efficiency wage premium derived in Section 3. If 
the official embezzles more than this, he is detected and fired. Tolerating embezzlement becomes 
simply another mechanism for paying the efficiency wage premium, which may enable the ruler 
to get around political or ideological restrictions that make it costly to pay the premium directly.  
                                                 
19 This is consistent with the empirical finding that democracy reduces corruption (e.g. Treisman 2000, Lederman, 
Loayza, and Soares 2005). 
 
20 To focus on the main point of the paper, we do not study efficiency wages and embezzlement together. Since we 
assume that rulers pay some political or ideological cost for tolerating embezzlement, if both efficiency wage and 
embezzlement were available, rulers should always prefer to pay the efficiency wage. If the ruler could pay small 
efficiency premia—but not ones large enough to deter all bribery—optimal policies would likely involve a 
combination of efficiency wage premia and tolerated embezzlement. 
   18
In most circumstances, however, embezzlement is an imperfect substitute. Suppose 
0  G . There are then three subgames, defined by the values of b and e: (1)  0  b  and  0  e ; (2) 
0  b  and  0  e ; and (3)  0  b  and  0  e . It is straightforward to prove that case (1) cannot 
occur in equilibrium: 
 
Lemma 1.  0  b  and  0  e cannot both be true in equilibrium.  
 
The intuition is as follows. Suppose, on the contrary, that b and e are both positive, and 
that the tax rate is low. A marginal tax increase will increase the ruler’s tax revenue, but will 
simultaneously decrease the official’s bribe income. To make up for this, the official will 
embezzle more. But because of the inefficient nature of the competition between taxation and 
bribery, the increase in the amount the official embezzles will be greater than the ruler’s gain in 
higher tax revenue. Thus, as proved in the appendix, the ruler, anticipating the response of the 
official, would be best off setting the tax rate at zero: in equilibrium, if b > 0 and e > 0, t = 0. 
Here, however, we wish to focus on the case in which the ruler collects a positive amount of tax 
revenue, and so in equilibrium b and e cannot both be positive.
21  
This leaves two equilibrium possibilities: (2)  0  b  and  0  e ; (3)  0  b  and  0 e . 
Consider (2) first. In this case, the official’s utility maximization problem must yield an interior 
solution for b but a corner solution for e. The official’s utility is:  
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 (4.1)   
                                                 
21 If some assumptions in the model are relaxed—for example, if we suppose that the official will never be caught if 
the amount of bribe is small—then a low level of bribery can coexist with embezzlement in equilibrium. In this case, 
too, the official will treat embezzlement and bribery as substitutes, and the essential logic of the model will still hold.    19
where  /( 1 ) e     is the official’s survival probability. This is easier to maximize in logarithmic 
form: ln ln ln(1 ) ln[ (1 ) (1 )]
be Ue w e b t b            . The first order conditions are: 
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or, using (4.3), setting e = 0, and rearranging:     
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4






     ( 4 . 5 )  
Since by assumption e = 0, (4.4) and (4.5) are strict inequalities. 
From (4.3), b is independent of , and so the ruler will set  0   . The ruler will also 
choose the smallest possible  to save on the cost of monitoring—namely:   
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The first order condition of (4.7) with respect to t is: 
   
2
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We denote the solution to (4.8) 
b t . Inserting 
b t t   into (4.7) we get a value of 
b V , which we 
denote  
* ) (
b V .   20
















as in (3.11). Here, however, e is interpreted as 
embezzlement rather than as an efficiency wage premium, and its level is set by the official, 
interacting strategically with the ruler. Given that the official is not taking bribes, his objective 
function is:  
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Note that the analysis here is almost identical to that in Section 3.2  except that now the ruler has 
to pay a cost of monitoring embezzlement. Thus, as in (3.12), we can write the ruler’s objective 
function as: 
22 2
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Inserting (4.11) into (4.12), we get 
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The first order conditions of (4.13) with respect to t and ρ are:    21
  0 ) 1 (
)
) 1 (
)( 1 ( 2
























() (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 0























We denote the solutions for t and ρ in (4.14) and (4.15) 
e t  and 
e  . Now, from (4.11) we know 
that  0  e  if and only if 
  w
e     (4.16) 
Moreover, inserting 
e t t   and 
e     into (4.13) we get a value of 
e V , which we denote 
* ) (
e V .  
If (4.16) is not satisfied, we will have  0  e . In this case, we insert  0  e  into (4.12), and we can 
then obtain the optimal solutions of t and ρ, and consequently the optimal solution of 
e V , which 
we continue to denote as 
* ) (
e V . 
We define 
 
* * * ) ( ) (
b e V V V     (4.17) 
where 
* ) (
e V  is the ruler’s utility when the official does not take bribes and 
* ) (
b V is the ruler’s 
utility when the official takes bribes. Clearly the ruler will implement measures, including 
allowing embezzlement, to eliminate bribery if and only if  0
*  V . We now have the following 
lemma. 
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This lemma implies that as the mechanism of monitoring bribery becomes more efficient, the 
ruler will tend to favor the “embezzlement scheme” more. Moreover, in the appendix we prove 
that when A is sufficiently small,  0
*  V , and when A is sufficiently large,  0
*  V . Thus, 
holding all parameters other than A constant, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold level of A, 
cc A , such that  
(1) If 
cc A A  , there is a unique equilibrium in which the official takes bribes, and the ruler does 
not monitor bribe extraction but spends enough resources on monitoring embezzlement to 
deter the official from embezzling.  
(2) If 
cc A A ,  there is a unique equilibrium in which the official does not take bribes, and the 
ruler devotes some resources to monitoring bribe extraction; if Condition (4.16) is satisfied, 
the ruler allows the official to embezzle a certain amount.  
 
Much as in Proposition 1, the ruler can only deter bribe taking if his monitoring 
mechanism is sufficiently effective. If this is the case, then embezzlement may serve as a 
substitute for the efficiency wage, providing the carrot that enhances the power of the ruler’s 
stick, the threat of dismissal. Indeed, Proposition 2 parallels Proposition 1, with the condition 
(4.16) corresponding to (3.16).  
Proposition 2 shows how rational behavior can produce the—at first sight paradoxical—
outcome that officials engage in quite open forms of corruption and their political bosses largely 
tolerate this. The alternative would be to drive officials into corrupt activities that are more 
destructive of economic activity and waste resources on secrecy. Although the Politburo does not   23
publish minutes of its meetings and deciphering the thinking of closed authoritarian regimes is 
very difficult, we believe that something like this has been occurring in China. The result—in 
which a principal (the ruler) chooses not to reward or punish an agent (the official) based on his 
performance at an easily measurable task for fear of changing his effort allocation across tasks—
is analogous to that of Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) model of multi-task agency.  
Analogous to Corollary 1, we have the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 3. When A is sufficiently small, e = 0 if and only if 
 
  G w 2    (4.18) 
 
When it is possible to pay an efficiency wage premium, we saw in Corollary 1 that the ruler was 
more likely to do so when the monitoring mechanism was not too effective (A not too small), and 
the basic wage, w, was lower. Proposition 3 establishes parallel results for when embezzlement 
serves as a substitute for the efficiency wage. Now, very intuititvely, the ruler will be more likely 
to permit some embezzlement when the cost of embezzlement, γ, and the basic wage, w, are 
lower, and when the cost of monitoring embezzlement, G, is higher.  
The extent of embezzlement depends on A, the effectiveness of monitoring bribery. A 
will clearly vary with the effectiveness of the legal and administrative systems. This suggests 
insights into how the pattern of corruption will tend to change if and when countries develop 
more effective states. When A is high (enforcement is very weak), countries experience bribery 
but not much embezzlement. If, at some point, reforms strengthen law enforcement, the country 
transitions to a phase in which there is not much bribery but more embezzlement. Other things   24
equal, this phase will coincide with faster economic growth, since embezzlement is generally 
less distortionary than bribery. Further administrative and legal reforms may promote the country 
to a phase in which enforcement is sufficiently powerful to deter most bribery and embezzlement. 
The reduction in embezzlement should come earlier (see 4.18) in countries which are not 
constrained by ideology or politics to pay low wages to bureaucratic officials. In such countries, 
an efficiency wage premium can be substituted for tolerated embezzlement. 
The state reforms that shift countries from the mostly-bribery to the mostly-
embezzlement phase are certainly not inevitable. Some countries clearly get stuck in equilibria in 
which bribery is widespread and economic activity is depressed. We believe that China, with its 
moderately effective legal-administrative system, is in the embezzlement phase, which is 
consistent with relatively rapid growth. Were public protests to pressure the government into 
cracking down on embezzlement, this could prompt substitution into bribery, depressing 
business activity. The ultimate solution for China’s further development is clearly to enhance the 
effectiveness of the legal and administrative systems for monitoring bribery, while 
simultaneously increasing the official wages of its civil servants. 
Since the first order conditions (4.14) and (4.15) have no closed form solution, we 
illustrate with a simulation. Setting the following parameter values—λ = 0.4; α = 0.8; β = 0.5; γ 
= 1.4; w = 0.1; G = 0.0137; A = 0.000001—we derive values for the endogenous variables in 
Table 1. The two columns detail two scenarios: in the first, only bribery occurs; in the second, 
only embezzlement occurs. In the second, despite the embezzlement, the ruler is better off than 
in the first, in which stricter enforcement deterred all embezzlement. This is the case even though 
embezzlement is assumed very costly to the ruler: each dollar embezzled causes $1.40 of losses 
once the embarrassment of being seen to tolerate embezzlement is taken into account ( = 1.4). It   25
is also fiscally costly: about half of the ruler’s total tax revenues are embezzled.
22 Although to an 
uninformed observer, this outcome might therefore appear dysfunctional and paradoxical, it 
actually represents optimal behavior for the actors given the constraints.  
Moreover, it turns out that in this example the public is also much better off when the 
ruler permits some embezzlement. Because the tax and bribe rates are lower (the bribe rate is set 
to zero), more output is produced and a larger share of it is retained and consumed by the public. 
As many have pointed out, uncoordinated predation tends to be more costly to the victims than 
coordinated predation. Our embezzlement case—in which the ruler sets a tax rate and then shares 
revenues with the official by allowing him to embezzle a certain share of them—constitutes 
coordinated predation. The bribery case—in which both ruler and official separately impose a 
(tax or bribe) levy on firms—constitutes uncoordinated predation, with the familiar distortionary 













  The example also shows why it may be hard to distinguish empirically between cases in 
which embezzlement is tolerated and those in which it is not. Even those regimes that allow 
some embezzlement as a lesser evil will, for ideological or political reasons, often claim to be 
                                                 
22 That is, 0.07/t(1 - t) = 0.07/0.14.   26
trying to eliminate it. Moreover, as the example shows, they may prosecute a large number of 
embezzlers. The proportion of officials fired for embezzling funds in this example is: 1-1/(1 + e) 
= 0.205, or 20.5 percent. (By contrast, in the stylized reality of the model, one would see no 
prosecutions of bribe-takers in this case since the ruler successfully deters all bribery.) Thus, the 
government “tolerating” embezzlement might, nevertheless, look to outsiders like one that is 
actively fighting it.  
  One key parameter in the model is , which measures the cost of embezzlement to the 
ruler. Since embezzlement is relatively visible, it is likely to give the government a reputation for 
corruption. If the government is sensitive to such reputational effects,  will be higher. One 
would expect this to be truer in democracies than authoritarian regimes. Of course, the ruler 
could always replace embezzlement by an overt efficiency wage—and would do so if this were 
not constrained. Opposition to paying high wages to bureaucrats is likely to be strongest in 
countries with an egalitarian or populist official ideology or political culture. Thus, countries 
where  is high are likely to be egalitarian or populist democracies. Bearing this in mind, and 
holding all parameters except  constant, the following proposition holds. 
  









   
Other things equal, rulers with higher  are more likely to tolerate widespread bribery rather than 
allowing embezzlement in order to deter such bribery. Of course, many populist democracies in 
Latin American and elsewhere tend to have high rates of bribery because they tend to be at low 
or intermediate levels of economic development. But another reason could be that their   27
governments are constrained from compensating officials highly enough—either overtly or by 
permitting illicit consumption of budget funds—to deter them from taking bribes. They lack the 
carrots that would make their sticks more effective.   
  The ruler’s behavior will also depend on how greatly he values social welfare (and 
economic output), as shown in Proposition 5.   
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In words, so long as the tax rate the ruler would set in the equilibrium with embezzlement is not 
too high, rulers who place relatively greater value on economic output and private consumption 
will be more likely to tolerate embezzlement. Thus, we should expect to see such bureaucratic 
embezzlement more often in democracies and growth-oriented autocracies with weak—but not 
too weak—enforcement systems.   
 
5   Conclusion 
Different types of corruption impose different costs on businesses. We argue that this has two 
implications. First, politicians that strongly favor growth should be motivated to adopt strategies 
that encourage bureaucrats to substitute less costly for more costly methods of corrupt self-
enrichment. Second, in countries where different kinds of corruption predominate, the effect on 
growth will differ. As a result, in some countries corruption will severely impair growth, while in 
others it will prove far less damaging.    28
In particular, we focused on the tradeoff for politicians between fighting embezzlement 
and bribery. When, as is often the case, bribery is more distortionary, growth-oriented politicians 
have an incentive to tolerate embezzlement. Furthermore, since secrecy imposes dead-weight 
costs, it will be efficient to tolerate embezzlement even when it is quite blatant. Embezzlement is 
then analogous to an efficiency wage, increasing the value to the official of retaining his job, and 
thus reducing the incentive to risk it by engaging in bribery.  
Although we focus in this paper on the tradeoff between embezzlement and the extortion 
of bribes on top of tax payments, another type of bribery—“corruption with theft,” in Shleifer 
and Vishny’s (1993) terms—in which officials collect bribes instead of taxes may be even more 
favorable for business development. We defer analysis of this to future work. An argument 
similar to the one developed in this paper is likely to apply. Given that officials are extracting 
bribes, politicians may choose not to enforce tax collection too strictly. To collect taxes in full, 
given the burden on firms of paying bribes, would drive too many firms out of business.  
These considerations help to explain why in China high levels of consumption by 
officials at the expense of the public budget are tolerated, even when such consumption is 
perfectly open. They may also help to explain why widespread corruption in China has not 
prevented extremely rapid growth in recent decades. Accurate  measures of the impact of 
corruption on firms are always hard to come by, and China is no exception. However, the ability 
of Chinese manufacturers to flourish in highly competitive export markets suggests that the 
burden of bribery cannot be too high, at least relative to other developing countries with similar 
or even lower labor costs, such as India or Bangladesh. Were bribes driving up the total 
production cost of manufactured goods more than elsewhere, Chinese firms would not be able to 
charge such low prices and win such large market shares. In more developed countries,   29
monitoring will tend to be more effective, allowing politicians to reduce embezzlement without 
stimulating too great an increase in distortionary bribery. But in other developing and transitional 
countries where law enforcement institutions are weak, such toleration of certain kinds of 
corruption may be optimal in a world of the second best.  
  The analysis in this paper has assumed that bribery is distortionary, discouraging 
economic activity. However, if firms are able to earn large rents because of monopoly or access 
to scarce natural resources, even the burden of paying significant bribes may not have much 
effect on firms’ output. At the same time, if rents accruing to private sector firms are large and 
tax rates low, officials may be able to extract more in bribes than they can obtain through 
embezzlement. In such cases, tolerating embezzlement may not be an effective means of 
deterring bribery, and one should expect large-scale bribery to be more widespread.  
Finally, it hardly needs to be restated that tolerating embezzlement is very much a second 
best solution. Two alternatives, when feasible, will reduce bribery at lower cost.. First, if 
governments are not limited in how much they can pay their bureaucrats, paying efficiency 
wages accomplishes the same objective with less hypocrisy and subterfuge. Second, increasing 
the rulers’ capacity to monitor and enforce rules against bureaucratic corruption reduces the need 
to offer such positive inducements.    30
Appendix: Mathematical Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. When the official takes bribes, inserting (3.5), (3.6) and  0    into 
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When the official does not take bribes, we write the ruler’s utility in the general form: 
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Thus, when A = 0 
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Thus, in this case  0  V .   31
When A is sufficiently large, the ruler needs to set  to be sufficiently small. In this case, 
in order to eliminate corruption, the ruler must set t close to 1 so that the official’s bribe income 
) 1 ( b t b   will be small even without monitoring. However, when t is close to 1, the ruler’s 
revenue will be close to zero.  Thus, in this case we have 
b e V V  , which means  0  V . 
Second, by the Envelope Theorem, we see that  








V d  (A.6) 
Thus, there exists a threshold level of A, 
c A , such that if 
c A A , there is a unique equilibrium 
in which the official takes bribes, and the ruler does not monitor bribe extraction and does not 
provide the official with an efficiency wage; if 
c A A , there is a unique equilibrium in which 
the official does not take bribes, and the ruler devotes a positive amount of resources to 
monitoring bribe extraction. 
  Next, we check under what conditions  0  e . Inserting  0  e  and (3.13) into (3.14), we 
get 
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Proof of Lemma 1.    32






Thus, the official’s expected utility is 
 
[ (1 ) (1 )] (1 ) (0)
11
[( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
1











     





  ln ln ln(1 ) ln[ (1 ) (1 )]
be Ue w e b t b             (A.11) 
The ruler’s utility is 
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We now prove this lemma by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium  0  b  and  0  e . Then, 
From (A.11), the first order conditions are:  
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The first order conditions of (A.17) with respect to t and  are:  
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from which:  
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, the inequality in A.20 must be strict, so  0   . Inserting this into A.19 yields:
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 t  (A.21) 
Recalling that by assumption  1   ,  1 0    , and  1 0    , the numerator of A.21 must be 
positive. If  (1 )(2 )     , then from A.21,  0  t , which contradicts the assumption that 
01 t . On the other hand, if  (1 )(2 )     , then (1 )(1 ) (1 )(2 )          , 
implying from A.21 that  1 t  , which also contradicts 01 t   . Thus,  0  b  and  0  e cannot 
both be true in equilibrium. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.  By the Envelope Theorem (as in A6), we see that 
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Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 1.  
First, when A is sufficiently large, the ruler needs to set  to be sufficiently small. In this case, in 
order to eliminate corruption, the ruler must set t close to 1 so that the official will not take bribes. 
However, when t is close to 1, the ruler’s revenue will be close to zero.  Thus, in this case we 
have 
* * ) ( ) (
b e V V  , which means  0
*  V . 
 Second,  when  A = 0, the ruler can costlessly set  = 1, which implies that b = 0. In this 
case, 
* ) (
b V  is  the value of V when b = 0 and  is the value determined by (4.6), in which case e 
= 0. Note that by definition, we know that 
* ) (
e V  is greater than or equal to the value of V when b 
= 0 and  is the value determined by (4.6). Moreover, it is easy to verify that when  is the value 
determined by (4.6), it does not satisfy the first order conditions (4.14) and (4.15). Thus, it must 
be that 
* ) (
e V  is greater than the value of V when b = 0 and  is the value determined by (4.6), 
namely 
* * ) ( ) (
b e V V  . Thus, in this case, compared to the case in which the official takes bribes, 
the ruler is clearly better off:  0
*  V . 
From Lemma 2, we know that  there exists a threshold level of A, 
cc A , such that if 
c A A , there is a unique equilibrium in which the official takes bribes, and the ruler does not 
monitor bribe extraction and does not allow the official to embezzle; if 
cc A A , there is a unique 
equilibrium in which the official does not take bribes, and the ruler devotes a positive amount of   35
resources to monitoring bribe extraction. Meanwhile, as demonstrated in the text, the ruler allows 
the official to embezzle a certain amount if Condition (4.20)  is satisfied. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. When A = 0, (4.15) becomes   





















   (A.29) 
Inserting (A.29) into (4.16) and rearranging, we get 
  w G   2  (A.30) 
Thus, if (4.18) is satisfied, (A.30) will be not be satisfied, which implies e = 0. This is the case 
when A = 0. Then, by continuity, we know that the result will continue to hold when A is 
sufficiently small.  
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